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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is early morning May 15, 2010 in the Belmont section of the
Bronx. Kalief Browder and his friend are on their way home from a
party. 1 He is sixteen. Walking home along Arthur Avenue, “Little
Italy’s” main street, they pass familiar stores, delis, and bakeries, their
corrugated aluminum shutters pulled down and pad locked tight.

*
© Donald Jones, all rights reserved. D. Marvin Jones is Professor of Law at the
University of Miami. His most recent book is DANGEROUS SPACES: BEYOND THE RACIAL
PROFILE (Praeger 2016).
1
The facts of the story are based on the following articles about the incredible case of
Kalief Browder. Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law: A boy was accused of taking a
backpack. The court took three years of his life. THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law (hereinafter Before the
Law); Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, THE NEW YORKER (June 7,
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015; Michael
Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Riker’s Island for 3 years Without
Trial, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/nyregion/kaliefbrowder-held-at-rikers-island-for-3-years-without-trial-commits-suicide.html?_r=0.
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Suddenly a police car speeds toward them and careens to a stop.2
More police cars arrive in rapid succession. 3 As they stare into the police
headlights an officer informs them that they are suspects in a robbery. 4
Kalief maintains his innocence as he would unwaveringly for the next
few years. “I did not rob anyone,” Kalief says. 5 “You can check my
pockets.” The officers conduct the search but come up with nothing. 6 An
officer goes back to talk to the witness in the squad car. Now apparently
the man in the squad car changes his story. The policeman says the man
claimed the two youths had robbed him “two weeks ago.” 7
The police arrest Kalief and his friend on the spot. 8 Based on the
uncorroborated allegation of a man in the squad car about a two week old
robbery, police take Kalief and his friend to the police station and charge
him with robbery, grand larceny, and assault. His bail was set at
$3000.00. 9 Kalief’s mother cannot raise that amount. It is completely
out of reach. 10
Browder found himself aboard a Department of Correction bus.
“Staring through the grating on the bus window, he watched the Bronx
disappear. Soon, there was water on either side as the bus made its way
across a long, narrow bridge to Rikers Island.” 11
The court system in the Bronx is broken. “Defense lawyers are
notorious for dilatory tactics, prosecutors are often unprepared.”12 The
majority of criminal cases are disposed of by plea. Browder steadfastly
refuse to plead guilty, insisting he was innocent. Browder stayed at
Rikers for three years. 13 He spent two of those years in solitary
confinement. 14 During this period, he claims he endured constant
beatings at the hands of both inmates and guards. 15
In the film 12 Years a Slave, Solomon Northup, a successful
musician and free man living in Saratoga, is kidnapped by white men and

2
3
4
5
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12
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15

Before the Law, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Before the Law, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Schwirtz & Winerip, supra note 1.
Id.
Gonnerman, supra note 1.
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clandestinely transported to the slaveholding antebellum south.16 To his
family and friends Solomon had simply disappeared.
In a real sense so did Kalief Browder. He became a member of a
dangerous population whose incarceration defines a boundary between
the criminal and the respectable, between us and the dangerous threats.
The fact that Kalief could remain incarcerated at Rikers for three years
without a trial shows the studied indifference, disregard, and disrespect
of society for him. It is symptomatic of the studied indifference,
disregard, and disrespect society has for poor people of color who suffer
daily the brutal conditions at the jail-prison system at Rikers.
Northup for the twelve years he was gone would have seemed to
“disappear.” Browder to his family and friends, out of sight at Rikers,
may have seemed to disappear as well, a disappearance associated only
with those who are actually dead and those convicted and imprisoned for
a felony.
But Browder was never convicted of anything. There were no
hearings in any court in which evidence was presented against him.
There was only the uncorroborated allegation by “a man in squad car”
that Kalief and his friend had robbed him “two weeks ago” at the time of
his arrest. And even that story was inconsistent with the police officer’s
original accusation.
On this flimsy basis, Browder had been incarcerated and imprisoned,
invisible apparently to a system which hypocritically holds that justice
delayed is justice denied. Justice never showed up at all for Browder.
Justice, like Browder, disappeared for three years. Browder spent two
years of the three years he was incarcerated—without trial—in solitary
confinement. He was forced to accept conditions of hyper-isolation,
which were particularly inhumane, for two years of his life. And he had
to accept that this was happening without ever having a day in court,
without ever having an opportunity to confront witnesses, without ever
being treated as a citizen with rights. The injustice of something like this
happening to anyone seems unbelievable, fantastic. In Birth of a
Nation’hood: Gaze, Script and Spectacle in The O.J. Simpson Case, 17
Toni Morrison talks about the “sudden transformation of the
unbelievable into belief.” 18 Browder would have to believe, that the
unbelievable thing had happened, and that it had happened to him
The shock of this transition would have been maddening to anyone.

16

12 YEARS A SLAVE (Fox Searchlight 2013).
TONI MORRISON, BIRTH OF A NATION’HOOD: GAZE, SCRIPT,
O.J. SIMPSON CASE (2010).
18
Id.
17
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After his release Kalief became “afraid of being attacked on the
subway and that his TV was watching him. 19 He was afraid to go out of
the house for fear of being attacked.
He did make halting steps to create a future for himself. While in
college he writes an essay in which he details the dehumanizing and
psychologically destructive effects of solitary confinement. It was
prophetic. “On June 6, 2015 about 12:15 p.m. “[Browder] went into
another bedroom, pulled out the air conditioner, and pushed himself out
through the hole in the wall, feet first, with a cord wrapped around his
neck.” 20
Browder’s mother was the only other person home at the time. After
hearing a loud thump, she went upstairs to look for her son but he wasn’t
there. When she went outside she saw that he had hanged himself. 21
Officially Browder’s death was listed as a suicide. But I question
that. I argue his death was a homicide.
Fully situated members of the community have rights, and if they
were incarcerated, they would not wait three years to get a trial. But
those who are black, poor, and in urban spaces live in a kind of social
limbo where they are not considered worthy of the same level of
recognition, social protection, or rights. They are always and already
depersonalized. They are disposable in the sense that when they are
falsely arrested or incarcerated for years without trial or killed, there is
routinely no accountability—their lives don’t matter. Said another way,
what made Kalief’s treatment possible is that the Kalief Browders are
invisible to the legal system and effectively right-less persons. They are
socially dead.
My essay will unfold in three parts. First I explore the meaning of
social death. The concept of social death is borrowed from Orlando
Patterson’s work Slavery and Social Death. 22 In effect I argue that
Browder experienced a status which was both the legacy of slavery and
comparable to it: he was socially dead. To appreciate this analogy, we
will explore social death as it applies to the status of the slave. Second,
we will discuss how the conditions and treatment Browder received
reproduced phenomenologically the conditions of slavery. Finally, I will
argue that these conditions led directly to his death.

19

Nisha, Kalief Browder Hangs Himself After Spending Three Years on Riker’s Island
Without Trial, THE SOURCE (June 9, 2015), http://thesource.com/2015/06/09/kaliefbrowder-hangs-himself-after-spending-three-years-on-rikers-island-without-trial/.
20
Schwirtz & Winerip, supra note 1.
21
Id.
22
ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH (Harvard Univ. Press 1985).
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II.

WHAT WAS SLAVERY?

Positioned at the edge of social life, neither included nor expelled,
the slave is “in a permanent condition of liminality” and must forever
mourn his own social death. 23

A.

Powerlessness

Slavery was first of all a relation of total domination of man by man.
“The slave was a dominated thing, an animated instrument, a body with
natural movements, but without its own reason, an existence entirely
absorbed in another.” 24 The power of the master was absolute:
the subject, one doomed in his own person, and his
posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the
capacity to make anything his own, and to toil that
another may reap the fruits . . . such services can only be
expected from one who has no will of his own; who
surrenders his will in implicit obedience to that of
another. Such obedience is the consequence only of
uncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing
else that can operate to produce the effect. 25
More specifically what does the absolute power of the master mean
from the perspective of the slave? The slave was first of all powerless to
control his own body. The master could command the slave to stand, or
sit, or walk, or work, for how long. The master decided if he wanted to
use the slave’s body for sexual purposes or for any other purpose.
I was called up on one of her [Miss Ada’s] birthdays,
and Marster [sic] Bob sorta looked out of de corner of
his eyes, first at me and then at Miss Ada, and then he
make a little speech. He took my hand, put it in Miss
Ada’s hand, and say: “Dis your birthday present, darlin’”
I make a curtsy and Miss Ada’s eyes twinkle like a star
and she take me in her room and took on powerful over
me. 26
Ultimately the master controlled the slave’s mind as well as his
body, “such methods make the psyche of the oppressed the focus of

23
24
25
26

Id.
Id.
State v. Mann, 13 N. C. 263 (1 Dev.) (1829) (per curiam).
PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 12.
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control and domination.” 27 Thus, Ruffin says flatly, “the slave has no
will of his own . . . the slave surrenders his will in implicit obedience to
another.” 28 The slave was a machine of flesh and blood controlled by the
master’s commands, “in a perfect state of slavery they could become if
guided by the master’s rational will, something like machines or
prosthetic devices.29 Thus in the motion picture Twelve Years a Slave the
master at various times rapes, whips, works, or commands Patsy (Lupita
Nyong’O) to dance for his amusement. 30 This power of absolute control
over the body of the slave emanated from several sources, the most
important of which was the threat of violence against the slave.
To effectuate this power, the law placed no constraints on the how
much force the master could use or how to use it. As Judge Ruffin wrote,
“The power of the master must be absolute to render the submission of
the slave perfect.” 31 Similarly, Patterson writes, “The master’s absolute
power and the slave’s total powerlessness rested on the use and threat of
violence.” 32 All societies come into being through violence. For fully
situated members of the community, violence crystallizes into law,
which are rules backed by threats—symbolic violence. For the slave
direct violence created the status of slavery:
“the slave’s powerlessness originated or was conceived
of as having originated as a substitute for death usually
violence death. . The condition of slavery did not . . .
erase the prospect of death . . . it was a conditional
commutation. The execution was suspended only as long
as the slave acquiesced in his powerlessness. The master
was essentially a ransomer. What he bought or acquired
was the slave’s life.33
From moment to moment the slave was forced to choose between
their slave status—powerlessness—and death.
Violence also maintained the slave relationship. Given the inhuman
conditions of slave life, it was necessary to continually to repeat the

27

Id.
Supra note 25.
29
BENJAMIN REISS, THE SHOWMAN AND THE SLAVE: RACE, DEATH AND MEMORY IN
BARNUM’S AMERICA 121 (2001).
30
12 YEARS A SLAVE (Fox Searchlight 2013).
31
State v. Mann, 13 N. C. at 266; See also D. MARVIN JONES, RACE, SEX AND
SUSPICION: THE MYTH OF THE BLACK MALE 154 (Praeger 2005).
32
HUSSEIN ABDILAHI BULHAN, FRANTZ FANON AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPPRESSION
122 (1985); PATTERSON, supra note 22.
33
PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 5.
28
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original, violent act of transforming a free man into slave.” 34 As George
P. Rawick writes, “whipping was not only a method of punishment. It
was a conscious device to impress upon the slaves that they were slaves;
it was a crucial form of social control particularly if we remember it was
difficult for slaves to run away peacefully.”35

B.

Rightlessness

In 12 Years a Slave Northup was imprisoned in a cellar about
twelve-feet-square. Steps led up from the cellar into a yard surrounded
by a brick wall ten or twelve feet high immediately in the rear of a
building of the same width as itself. 36 Hidden behind a building which
appeared to be a residence, and behind a ten to twelve foot wall, is the
underground slave pen where Northup was held. This pen is physically
invisible to the larger society. This is a metaphor for the fact that the
slave was invisible to the law, behind a kind of iron curtain belonging to
no community and having no rights. This rightlessness is the
concomitant to the powerlessness of the slave at the hands of the master
under the law of slavery. Thus Chief Justice Taney could say, “They had
for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior
order; and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in
social or political relations; and so far inferior that they had no rights
which the white man was bound to respect.” 37
This was conceptualized by the notion that the slave was property.
“The slave-code . . . of the Southern States is designed to keep millions
of human beings in the condition of chattels personal; to keep them in a
condition in which the master may sell them dispose of their time,
person, and labour . . . ” 38 A corollary here the slave had no right to his
body, his labor, or himself. Thus William Gödel could say, “Having no
right to himself, to his bones, muscles, and intellect (being all of them
property of his “owner”), [the slave] has no right to his own
industry . . .” 39
But property was a metaphor. The key aspect of the relation is that
the slave was objectified or thingified in order to create the relation of
absolute domination. “Not being accounted a person but thing [the slave]
34

PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 3; see also KELLY L. WHRENHAVEN,
THE SLAVE: THE IMAGE OF THE SLAVE IN ANCIENT GREECE 70 (2012).

35

RECONSTRUCTING

Id. at 70.
Id. at 38.
37
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857). See also D. Marvin Jones, Darkness
Made Visible: Law Metaphor and the Racial Self, 82 GEO. L. J. 437, 453 (1993).
38
2 HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, THE WRITINGS OF HARRIET BEECHER STOWE WITH
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTIONS 309 (Cambridge, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., vol. II 1896).
39
ANDREW FEDE, PEOPLE WITHOUT RIGHTS 4 (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1992).
36
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can have no personal rights to be protected.” Andrew Fede in his book
thus concludes slaves were people but people without rights. Fede thus
quotes George Stroud to say, [T]he cardinal principle of slavery was the
notion that “the slave is to be regarded as a thing—an article of
property—a chattel personal . . . ” 40

C.

Invisibility

Thirdly, the psychological implications of being defined as and
treated as an object was a sense of invisibility. By that I mean the sense
of wandering through life as a ghost, living an existence in which you are
not only unseen by courts and the law but unseen and invisible to your
family, friends, and community. It is of course not just being physically
unseen—as Solomon was in William’s slave pen and on the plantation in
the south- but a matter of being so erased by one’s lack of social status
that no one takes notice. Patterson calls it the loss of honor. John Adams
writes:
He feels himself out of sight of others, groping in the
dark. Mankind takes no notice of him. He rambles and
wanders unheeded. In the midst of a crowd, at church, in
the market he is as much in obscurity as he would be in a
garret or a cellar. He is not disapproved, censured, or
reproached, he is only not seen. 41
While Adams was writing about the “unseen” status of the poor, this
applies even more powerfully with the slave. The significance of this
“invisibility” is that the slave is a ghost for social purposes—someone
existing but not really living. The slave, as a ghost, experienced his
invisibility as a total negation of any sense of “self-hood.” Henry Louis
Gates tells a story about a slave who was asked about his “self.” The
slave replied, “I ain’t got no self.” 42

D.

Social Death

Powerlessness, rightlessness, and invisibility all merged in this
notion that the slave was socially dead. Social death means that the slave
was perceived by society and the law as a non-being.
40

Id.
6 JOHN ADAMS, THE WOKS OF THE SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH
A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 239 (Little Brown and Co. 1851).
42
HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., BEARING WITNESS: SELECTIONS FROM AFRICAN AMERICAN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 7 (Pantheon Books 1991); see also JONES,
supra note 31, at 55.
41
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The captive always appears therefore as marked by an
original, indelible defect which weighs endlessly upon
his destiny.” This is [marked] in Izard’s words, a kind of
“social death.” He can never be brought to life again as
such since, in spite of some specious examples . . . the
slave will remain forever an unborn being (non-né). 43
Thus Burch changed Solomon’s name.
When Solomon is first drugged and kidnapped he is turned over to
Burch who runs the slave depot in Washington. While Solomon was
asleep, Burch removes Solomon’s clothes, outward traces of his old
identity, and dresses him up in rags and chains. When Solomon wakes up
he desperately clings to his identity as a free man:
I asserted, aloud and boldly, that I was a free man—a
resident of Saratoga, where I had a wife and children,
who were also free, and that my name was Northup. I
complained bitterly of the strange treatment I had
received, and threatened, upon my liberation, to have
satisfaction for the wrong. 44
Burch incensed responds by silencing Northup with insults and a
brutal whipping.
With blasphemous oaths he called me a black liar, a
runaway from Georgia . . . Burch ordered the paddle and
cat-o-nine tails brought in . . . With the paddle Burch
commenced beating me. Blow after blow was inflicted
on my naked body. He stopped and asked if I still
insisted I was a free man. I did insist upon it and then the
blows were renewed. 45
A man’s name is of course more than simply a way of calling him. It
is the verbal sign of his whole identity, his being in the world as a
distinct person. By changing his name, Solomon—the free person—
ceased to exist. He was dead to society as a socially dead thing. Solomon
was no longer entitled to that identity, to his past, to make decisions for
himself, to rights, to recognition by others as a human being
43

Patterson, supra note 22, at 38.
SOLOMON NORTHUP, TWELVE YEARS A SLAVE: NARRATIVE OF SOLOMON NORTHUP, A
CITIZEN OF NEW-YORK, KIDNAPPED IN WASHINGTON CITY IN 1841, AND RESCUED IN 1853,
FROM A COTTON PLANTATION NEAR THE RED RIVER, IN LOUISIANA 43 (David Wilson ed.,
Miller, Orton & Mulligan 1855).
45
Id.
44
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In slave society the social death of the slave was rationalized in one
of two ways. Patterson refers to these rationalizations as intrusive or
extrusive. In the intrusive conception the slave was generally a captured
enemy. “He stood . . . as a living affront to local gods, an intruder in a
sacred space.” 46 Patterson also states that in this intrusive or intruder
conception, “a slave was a stranger in a strange land.” 47 There is a
linkage between being an outsider and an enemy. Thus Patterson states,
“The slave in the city of man remained the archetypical outsider, the
eternal enemy within in a formalized state of marginality.” 48
The other conception was that the slave was an insider, a member of
the community “who had fallen.” This later image Patterson calls the
extrusive conception.49 Here the dominant image of the slave was that of
an insider who had fallen: One who ceased to belong and had been
expelled from normal participation in the community because of a failure
to meet certain minimal legal or socio-economic norms of behavior. 50
This latter notion of social death applies in the case of prisoners.
Historically prisoners suffered something called civil death. This
forfeiture of rights, formal rightlessness, was a function of a forfeiture of
personhood—social death—in the eyes of society.
There is close connection between being an outsider-intruder-enemy
and being a member of society who is exposed as a criminal. Both
become the enemies within and forfeit their social lives. They are both
socially dead—without freedom—they must always be under control,
without rights, and without honor or social recognition.
We think of violence as the act of whipping, or beating, or physical
abuse. But the great violence of slavery was treating living human beings
as non-beings, as socially dead. As human beings we need and are
defined by our freedom to make choices, to have dignity, to have
relationships with others. I would compare denying a person all these
things the violent equivalent of trapping someone in a space where there
is no air to breathe—something akin to being walled up in cave or buried
alive.
While Patterson focuses on social death as a function of how society
saw the slave, there is another dimension which is critical here. The slave
internalizes the violence of being pronounced socially dead. This means
being doomed to no freedom, no rights, and no dignity. Thus in the film
12 Years a Slave, when Solomon is finally rescued and is about to go
46
47
48
49
50

PATTERSON, supra note 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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free, Patsy in the end asks him not to leave her in bondage but to take her
to the river and kill her.

III.

THE SOCIAL DEATH OF KALIEF BROWDER

Now here’s a little truth, open up your eyes
While you’re checking out the boom-bap, check the exercise
Take the word “overseer,” like a sample
Repeat it very quickly in a crude voice sample
Overseer, overseer, overseer, overseer
Officer, officer, officer, officer
Yeah, officer from overseer
You need a little clarity, check the similarity
The overseer rode around the plantation
The officer is off, patrolling all the nation
The overseer could stop you what you’re doing
The officer will pull you over just when he’s pursuing
The overseer had the right to get ill
And if you fought back, the overseer had the right to kill
The officer has the right to arrest
And if you fight back they put a hole in your chest (Woop) 51
The lyrics of KRS-One one draw a continuous line between the
depredations of modern day police and the practices of the overseers of
the Antebellum South.
51

KRS-ONE, Sound of Da Police, on RETURN OF THE BOOM BAP (Jive Records 1993).
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The lyrics resonate in the critique of Lisa Marie Cacho who argues
that African Americans in the inner city suffer from slavery like status—
social death—even before they are formally criminalized by arrest:
African Americans in the inner city are not eligible for
civil rights not only because racism is defined in law as
personal prejudice but also because inner-city spaces are
criminalized. Criminalization . . . not only forecloses
empathy but also does so through producing people and
places always already subject to a form of discrimination
believed to be both legitimate and deserved . . . . “Their
plight is not that they are not equal before the law, but
that no law exists for them.” 52
The criminalization of urban areas—the post-industrial ghetto—is
the result of forces which transformed inner city areas from once thriving
communities to the post-industrial ghettos of today. The Bronx is a
classic case. Blacks who moved up from the South and from the
Caribbean were relegated to areas like the Bronx.53 Other ethnic groups
had an industrialized New York to take up their labor and time to get an
education and assimilate.54 But as Blacks and Hispanics moved in, the
jobs moved out. 55 Whites did as well. 56 The Bronx lost half of its
population in the sixties and seventies. 57 The housing in these areas was
already in a state of decay. By the time poor populations inhabited these
neighborhoods, decay was no longer incipient. “Like a heavy plank
society collapsed and the people left behind suffered the consequences. 58
The Bronx is over 90% black and Hispanic. 59 Over 30% of the residents
of the Bronx are below poverty level.60
Rather than respond with structural reform, society responded with a
drug war in the 1980s and war on crime beginning in the 1990s. These
so-called wars were not waged against drugs or crime, but were waged
52

LISA MARIE CACHO, SOCIAL DEATH: RACIALIZED RIGHTLESSNESS AND
CRIMINALIZATION OF THE UNPROTECTED 82 (NYU Press 2012).
53
H. V. SAVITCH, POST-INDUSTRIAL CITIES: POLITICS AND PLANNING IN NEW YORK,
PARIS, AND LONDON 42–43 (photo. reprint 2014) (1988). See also MICHAEL N.
DANIELSON & JAMESON W. DOIG, NEW YORK: THE POLITICS OF URBAN REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 53 (1982).
54
SAVITCH, supra note 53.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Quick Facts: Bronx County (Bronx Borough), New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/RHI225215/36005,00 (last visited July 23, 2016).
60
Id.
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against people of color in communities like the Bronx. 61 This military
mindset led to an “us vs. them” narrative which reflected popular culture
where once one steps across the line that separates the inner city from the
suburbs, one steps into a no man’s land populated by car-jackers,
gangbangers, robbers and thugs.
This stereotyping is reflected also in the astonishingly
disproportionate way criminal laws are administered. The NYACLU
found in their review of New York’s stop-and-frisk that in
neighborhoods populated by people of color, blacks were three to five
times more likely to be stopped by police.62 This is true despite the fact
whites were almost twice as likely to possess guns. 63
It is against this background we must understand Kalief’s stop,
arrest, and three years of incarceration without hearing or trial. It is not
merely that the legal system treated Kalief like someone who was
socially dead—with no recognition of his right to a speedy trial or due
process at all—he was always and already depersonalized as a member
of a working poor family living in a racialized and criminalized
community in the inner city, more specifically the Bronx. To understand
what I mean by a “racialized community” one need look no further than
the stop-and-frisk policy of New York. In conversation with a state
legislator, then-NYPD Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly responded
to a question form Senator Eric Adams about the clearly disproportionate
targeting of African American and Latino men. According to Adams,
Kelly said, that “he targeted and focused on that group because he
wanted to instill fear in them that every time they left their homes they
could be targeted by police.” 64 The statement takes on meaning in
context: the NYPD stop-and-frisk campaign in the Bronx was
specifically ruled unconstitutional on the basis of racial discrimination.65
The social death of Browder began, in this context, when he was
stopped by police walking down Arthur Avenue. Sometime in May 2010
someone allegedly robbed a Mexican immigrant named Robert
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Bautista. 66 Bautista says they pursued him, pushed him against a fence,
and took his backpack.” 67 According to Bautista, “his backpack
contained a credit card, a debit card, a digital camera and seven hundred
dollars.” 68
We will never know what the actual facts were because no
evidentiary hearing ever took place, much less a trial. However, we do
know that the police version of events was inconsistent with statements
made by the complaining witness. The original report said that the
robbery occurred “on or about May 2” but Bautista would later say that
the events happened on May 8. 69
Why did the police stop Browder? Did he fit a description? Did the
immigrant actually point him out? This raises two issues.
When the police came up to Browder to confront him with
allegations about “a two-week old robbery,” he was seized. He was
deprived of his freedom of locomotion. Under Terry v. Ohio, 70 this
seizure is called a stop. All searches and seizures are presumptively
illegal.71 To overcome the presumption, police need individualized facts
that a crime was committed. 72 Moreover, Browder and his friend
following the stop were actually arrested. Once they were handcuffed
and placed into the patrol car the stop became a full blown arrest. 73 This
required probable cause. 74 For probable cause to exist in this situation,
generally the complaining witness would have to have a track record of
proving reliable tips, or he would have had to provide the police with a
detailed description of the people who robbed him, or at least some
unique identifying behavior or feature.75 Failing that, the police would
need corroboration. Underlying this web of Fourth Amendment
constraints is a basic rule: the police need individualized suspicion to
justify a seizure or a search. 76 In a just system, whenever a citizen is
arrested, there would be a tribunal which would promptly, in matter of
hours, make sure there was this articulable suspicion was present.
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Such a determination was particularly important in Kalief’s case
because misidentification is very common. 77 This is especially true when
the witness is attempting to identify a stranger of another race. 78 But the
constitution requires only that there be a “speedy trial.”79 In New York
State the speedy trial right has been codified.80 Prosecutors have six
months in the case of felony to bring the case to trial. 81
However, actually calculating the time is not merely a matter of
counting days on a calendar. The United States Supreme Court has held a
balancing test must take place. 82 The equitable factors the court must
consider issues of waiver on the part of the defendant. There are many
other factors. In the Bronx the judges also do not count time caused by
court suggestion. It is only the prosecutor’s lack of readiness that counts
toward delay. Once the prosecutor files a notice of readiness the clock
stops.
the prosecution may also choose to announce “ready” at
the very first appearance, the arraignment. This stops the
speedy trial clock before it even begins, although the
district attorney knows there is no chance of a trial
actually taking place that day. The backlog of cases in
the New York criminal courts means that the case will
be put off, at least for a low level misdemeanor, for an
average of 120 days, not a single day of which is
charged against the speedy trial clock. 83
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Also, if the prosecution says it is not ready and requests a week, only
the week request is counted toward the delay. However, because of a
broken system the court delays the trial for many weeks. “Every time a
prosecutor stood before a judge in Browder’s case, requested a one-week
adjournment, and got six weeks instead, this counted as only one week
against the six-month deadline. Meanwhile, Browder remained on
Rikers, where six weeks still felt like six weeks—and often much
longer.” 84
The injustice of Browder’s case is the sheer incongruity of his being
incarcerated for three years on nothing more than an unsubstantiated
accusation. Browder had been arrested and indicted for a felony. But an
indictment is only an accusation. The rationale was that the delays which
occurred were not the fault of the prosecution—but they weren’t
Browder’s fault, either. Why was he not released? The single explanation
that exists is that Browder was, at least tacitly, presumed guilty. And he
was treated for all intents and purposes as if he was a guilty man.
What happened to Browder was inconsistent with his status as a
citizen of the United States. For him to be held at Rikers Island for three
years without a trial, much less a conviction, sounds like something that
could only happen in a failed state—in the third world perhaps—or in a
totalitarian regime.
Slavery was a totalitarian regime. It was a place where people were
incarcerated without evidence and without trial. What made this system
operate was the presumption that blacks were slaves, people without
rights.
Thus in Twelve Years a Slave, it is not clear that Burch actually knew
that Solomon had been kidnapped. Burch claimed that Solomon was a
slave “from Georgia.” 85 It is possible that Burch believed this. The
system of recovering fugitive slaves operated without due process. Under
the Fugitive Slave Act, slave catchers were authorized to arrest so-called
fugitive slaves without a warrant, take them to a federal magistrate, and
in a “summary” proceeding get a certificate from the magistrate to take
the slave away. 86 Pennsylvania passed a law to require slave catchers to
get a warrant from a Pennsylvania court before arresting black residents
without due process. The law was challenged in a case called Prigg v.
Pennsylvania. 87 The Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania’s legislation
was unconstitutional: states had no power to interfere with the recapture
of “slaves.” This is true because only Congress could legislate in this
84
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area. 88 This framework operated tacitly only on the basis of presumption
that all black people were presumed to be slaves.
Browder was not presumed to be a slave. He was presumed to be a
criminal. The presumption in context had a similar effect. He was treated
as someone with no right to a trial or evidentiary hearing. The
presumption of guilt in context relegated him to the status of a rightless
person.
Most people are surprised that Browder was in jail for three years.
But his case was not unique. As Daniel Hamburg writes, “In January
2013, seventy-three percent of all felony cases in the Bronx exceeded
New York’s 180-day speedy trial limit, including more than 800 felonies
still open at two years or more.” 89 According to the New York Times,
prosecutors routinely tell defense lawyers handling two and three year
old cases that they are “too new to be dealt with.”90 Some cases are
pending for more than five years.
Why do the authorities allow this to go on year after year? The
source of the problem is that the defendants in the Bronx have been
collectively stereotyped, marked, long before any arrest takes place. In
conventional terms they are collectively presumed guilty. But at a deeper
level the problem is that their guilt or innocence does not matter. The
goal of a criminal justice system is to adjudicate guilt or innocence and
to punish the guilty.
But the system in the Bronx is not worthy of that name. It is a police
regime.
The goal of the police regime seems to be one of control,
intimidation, and lockdown of dangerous populations in the Bronx. Its
concerns in a functional sense are efficiency and the reduction of
threats— not individualized justice. Individuals like Kalief Browder—
marked as members of this dangerous class—are invisible to the system.
What makes them invisible is fear. We warehouse them because it
assuages our fear.
In 12 Years A Slave, the slaves were hidden from view by the
exterior elevation of a building, which made the slave pen from the
outside appear to be a residence. A similar façade covers the Bronx
criminal justice system.It is a façade of formal equality in which we
assume that when a person is arrested there is probable cause, that there
is a presumption of innocence, and that the suspect has a right to a trial.
Behind that façade is a brutal reality of mass criminalization and
racialized social death.
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Solitary
The deeper sense in which the slave was socially dead was internal.
The slave was not only cut off from his family, denied all dignity by
society—unseen; the slave lacked the ability to make choices for himself.
These elements, connection with family, connection with society, ability
to make choices for oneself, define our sense of being human. All those
elements are lost in solitary confinement. Accordingly, those who have
experienced it refer it in terms which suggest a sense of being physically
alive yet dead.
Harry Hawser, a poet and inmate at Eastern State Penitentiary in the
1840s, called his cell “a living tomb.” 91 Angela Tucker, an African
American woman held at California’s Valley State Prison for Women in
the 1980s, said, “It’s like living in a black hole.”92
Lisa Guenther argues that this sense of being dead is enforced largely
through the denial of physical interaction with others. How could I lose
myself by being confined to myself? For this to be possible there must be
more to selfhood than individuality. Prisoners in a super-max unit may
have everything that individual human beings need in order to survive;
they may even have access to “extras” such as television or closed-circuit
television (CCTV) video conferencing with visitors. And yet there is
something about the absence of regular bodily contact with others, the
absence of even the possibility of touching or being touched, which
threatens to unhinge the subject.93
And even if the people in one’s life are not particularly sympathetic
or supportive, it becomes difficult to bear the weight of existence in
isolation from others. In this sense, solitary confinement makes even
solitude impossible; isolated from social life, even one’s sense of
individuated personhood threatens to dissolve. As a woman who
experienced pretrial solitary confinement in Denmark explained, “The
person subjected to solitary confinement risks losing herself and
disappearing into a non-existence.” 94
What is relevant here is that hyper-isolation is torture. It is not
merely sensory deprivation, it is violence. Slavery depended on violence
to maintain the master—slave relationship—to enforce a sense of
powerlessness. The extreme violence involved in depriving someone of
everything they need to be human functions in the Rikers Island context
to instill in the inmate the sense that the guards and the administration
91
LISA GUENTHER, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: SOCIAL DEATH
(UNIV. OF MINN. PRESS 2013).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.

AND ITS

AFTERLIVES xii

2016]THE LEGACY OF SLAVERY & THE SOCIAL DEATH OF KALIEF BROWDER 49

have absolute power over him. Hyper-isolation is the moral and
psychological equivalent of the overseer’s whip.

IV.

CONCLUSION

As of 2013, 4,446 inmates in local jails or state prisons died in
custody. 95 People of color were disproportionately represented. Perhaps
the most famous is Freddie Gray, who died in custody after he was
placed in a police van with no seat belt. 96 I would argue Kalief Browder
is like Freddie Gray: Kalief died as a result of police custody as well. In
the case of Freddie Gray, the violence was direct, as he was thrown into a
van, without a seat belt, and died from injuries recklessly inflicted on the
ride to the jail. The violence which caused the death of Kalief was
indirect, it was, in the framework of John Galtung, structural violence. 97
The concept of structural violence is “violence built into social and world
spaces which is unintended.” 98
Structural violence here includes poverty, as well as institutional
practices on the part of police who have militarized, over-policed, and
engaged in systemic denials of civil rights for decades during the drug
war and subsequently, in New York’s war against guns which targeted
neighborhoods like the Bronx. It includes a criminal justice system
which warehouses defendants, holding them for years without trial,
without hope. It includes the studied indifference of the criminal justice
system in its refusal to either see or address institutional barbarism of
keeping an inmate never convicted of a crime, in solitary confinement for
two of the three years he was incarcerated without trial. Structural
violence here includes treating Kalief Browder as someone who was
invisible, because of his intersectional status which includes at different
times the intersection of race, class, gender, space and the fact that he
was incarcerated at Rikers. Structural violence here includes the social
death of Kalief Browder.
The structural violence that Kalief Browder experienced occurred
largely because we as a society do not see it.
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The structural violence occurs sometimes behind the walls of jails
like Riker’s Island, and sometimes in plain sight, as when Kalief was, I
suspect, profiled and arrested.
The structural violence occurs because the process of racialization—
a legacy of slavery—has so erased the status of people like Kalief
Browder that they are not important- disposable people who do not
matter to us. They are in a profound sense invisibilized. We do not see
them.

